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I Leverage cycle – Geanakoplos
I Financial Instability Hypothesis – Minsky
I Basel III and the procyclicality of capital adequacy requirements
I Macro-prudential banking regulation






The Business & Financial Cycle
Financial Instability Hypothesis
Balance sheets






End of Regulation Q
1989:
S&L Crisis
1980: Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act: Deregulation of Savings and Loans institutions
2011: Regulation Q: prohibition of interest-bearing demand deposit accounts










I Equity/Asset-ratio: Measure for financial robustness
I Fragility synchronized with business cycle? (Fragile booms, deleveraging
recovery)
Output and E/A ratio










Features of macroeconomics with a financial cycle (Borio, 2012):
I the financial boom should not just precede the bust but cause it (a` la
Minsky).
I the presence of debt and capital stock overhangs (excess stocks,
non-full utilization rates).
Findings:
I Recessions following a crisis after a fragile boom tend to have much
larger declines in consumption, investment, output, and employment.
(Shularick & Taylor, 2012)
I Balance sheet recessions: Recessions driven by deleveraging lead to a
prolonged slump. (Koo, 2011)


















– interest on loans Loans from banks










CB reserves (−0.1%) Deposits
– interest deposits +/– withdrawals




Loans to firms CB debt (+0.15%)
+ new loans +/– CB reserves
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Monetary Policy & Banking Regulation
Capital Adequacy Requirement
Reserve Requirement
Literature: The Credit Channel of Monetary Policy Transmission
1. The broad borrowers’ balance sheet channel:
(Bernanke & Blinder 1988)
I Credit demand side
I Focusses on external finance premium: probability of default
External finance premium: inversely related to borrower’s net worth.
I Changes in the value of assets on the balance sheet of a firm affect the
firm’s ability to borrow.
2. The narrow bank lending channel:
(Bernanke & Gertler 1995)
I Supply of bank loans determined by financial health of banks.
I Changes in the value of assets on the balance sheet of a bank affects the
bank’s ability to lend.









1. Firm’s default probability




t }, ν = 0.1
2. Interest rate offered by bank b to firm i
r bft = r
ECB
(
1 + λB · PDft + bt
)
, bt ∼ U[0, 1]
rECB = 0.01
λB = 3: penalty rate for high-risk firm, uniform across banks
bt : bank’s ideosyncratic operating costs









1. Risk-exposure of credit request (Expected Loss at Default):
x ft = PD
f
t · Lft (1)
2. Constraint: Capital Adequacy Requirement (CAR)∑
f
x ft ≡ X bt ≤ αEbt , α ≥ 0 (2)
3. Risk-exposure ”budget” of the bank:




Lft if x ft ≤ V bt No rationing
θ · Lft = V bt /PDft if 0 ≤ V bt ≤ x ft Partial rationing
0 if V bt ≤ 0 Full rationing
(4)
Possibility of credit rationing: {θ : V bt − PDft · `ft = 0} → θLft = V bt /PDft









I Constraint: Reserve Requirement
Mbt ≥ β · Depbt (5)
I Excess liquidity ”budget” of the bank:




Lft if W bt ≥ Lft No rationing
φ · Lft = W bt if 0 ≤ W bt ≤ Lft Partial rationing
0 if W bt < 0 Full rationing
(7)
Possibility of credit rationing: {φ : W bt − φ · Lft = 0} → φ = W bt /Lft
I Illiquid banks stop lending to all firms (bank lending channel)
I Risky firms cannot get loans (borrower’s balance sheet channel)




























1.0 2.0 4.0 8.0 16.0 32.0
α-sensitivity: Cap. Adq. Req.
I Default: α = 32 (3%)
I Lower: amplitude of recessions
increases



















0.01 0.02 0.05 0.10 0.20 0.50
β-sensitivity: Reserve Req.
I Default: β = 0.05 (5%)
I Higher: amplitude of recessions
decreases




















































































































α-sensitivity: Cap. Adq. Req.
I Default: α = 32 (3%)



















































































































I Default: β = 0.05 (5%)
I Higher: amplitude of recessions
decreases









Number of illiquid firms
No constraint





















Capital constraint (α = 2)





















Liquidity constraint (β = 0.50)






























Number of active banks (unconstrained + constrained by equity/liquidity
constraint)
No constraint

















Capital constraint (α = 2)

















Liquidity constraint (β = 0.5)























Capital Adequacy Requirement (α)
1. More limits on excessive risk-taking
2. Amplitude recessions increases
3. More banks fail
4. More firms go illiquid
I constraint does not discriminate
I constraint self-reinforcing
5. Steep, sudden deleveraging
6. Concentration in banking sector
Reserve Requirement (β)
1. More limits on liquidity supply
2. Amplitude recessions decreases
3. Banks stay alive
4. Large firms go illiquid
I large firms largest credit demand
I liq. constraint helps small firms
5. Gradual deleveraging in waves
6. Bank equity can recover









I Empirically-grounded bank behavior
I Credit quotas
I Credit rationing of SMEs
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Scenario: Capital Adequacy Requirement
Output


















































































































































Scenario: Minimum Reserve Requirement
Output
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